CourtSupreme Court of India
CitationAIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 3717
Decided11 August 2020
BenchArun Mishra, S. Abdul Nazeer and M.R. Shah, JJ. (judgment authored by Arun Mishra, J.)

In short: Two earlier Supreme Court rulings disagreed on whether the 2005 change to the Hindu Succession Act gave daughters equal rights in joint family property. A daughter, whether born before or after the amendment, is a coparcener like a son, and because the right comes by birth, her father need not have been alive on 9 September 2005.

Facts

If a male coparcener died leaving certain female relatives, a daughter got only a limited share in his interest. She did not get it as a coparcener. The Union described this exclusion as discriminatory.

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 substituted Section 6 and came into force on 9 September 2005. It was meant to give daughters equality with sons. But the courts disagreed on how far it reached.

In Prakash v. Phulavati (2016), a Division Bench held that the new Section 6 was not retrospective. It applied only if both the coparcener and his daughter were alive on 9 September 2005. In Danamma v. Amar (2018), another Division Bench gave daughters equal shares even though the father had died in 2001, before the amendment.

Because of these conflicting verdicts, the question went to a larger bench. Several connected matters were heard with it. They included:

  • a case where the father died in 1994;
  • a case where only a preliminary decree in a partition suit had been passed;
  • a case where a suit filed in 2001 had been decided using Prakash, which cut the daughters' share to 1/35th;
  • cases where a partition was said to have happened orally or through an unregistered document.

Issues

  • Does the substituted Section 6 apply only to a daughter whose father (the coparcener) was alive on 9 September 2005?
  • Can a daughter born before the amendment claim coparcener rights?
  • What is the effect of the old "notional partition" on a coparcener's death?
  • Can daughters claim equal shares if only a preliminary decree has been passed in a partition suit?
  • Can a plea of oral or unregistered partition defeat a daughter's claim?

Held

  1. The substituted Section 6 makes a daughter a coparcener, whether she was born before or after the amendment. She has the same rights and liabilities as a son.
  2. A daughter born earlier can claim these rights from 9 September 2005. Any disposition, alienation, partition or testamentary disposition made before 20 December 2004 is protected.
  3. The right is by birth, so the father-coparcener need not be alive on 9 September 2005.
  4. The notional partition in the original Section 6 was only a fiction, used to work out a deceased coparcener's share. It did not cause an actual partition or end the coparcenary. Even if a preliminary decree has been passed, daughters must get a share equal to a son's in pending proceedings for a final decree or in an appeal.
  5. A plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as a recognised mode of partition. Only a registered deed of partition or a decree of a court counts. In exceptional cases, an oral partition may be accepted if it is supported by public documents and was finally worked out as if by a court decree. A plea resting on oral evidence alone must be rejected outright.

Even a registered deed must be shown to have been acted upon and not to be a sham. The Court also warned lower courts against upholding such pleas merely on a preponderance of probabilities.

The Court overruled Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju. It partly overruled Danamma to the extent that it was contrary to this decision. It asked the High Courts and lower courts to decide the pending matters, as far as possible, within six months. The individual cases went back to the appropriate benches to be decided on their merits.

Why it matters

  • It removes the confusion caused by conflicting rulings. A daughter's equal share no longer depends on whether her father was alive on a particular date.
  • It treats the daughter's coparcenary right as a birthright, in the same way as a son's.
  • It makes it much harder to defeat a daughter's claim by saying that a partition took place orally or on an unregistered paper. Such a claim now needs strong, contemporaneous public documents.
  • It gives daughters a way to claim equal shares even in suits where only a preliminary decree has been passed.

Exam one-liner

Under the substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a daughter is a coparcener by birth with equal rights from 9.9.2005, whether or not her father was alive then. (Vineeta Sharma, 2020, 3 judges)

Frequently asked questions

Does a daughter get equal rights if her father died before 2005?

Yes. The Court held that the right is by birth, so it is not necessary for the father-coparcener to have been living on 9 September 2005.

Can a family defeat a daughter's claim by saying property was divided orally?

Rarely. A plea based only on oral evidence must be rejected outright. Only in exceptional cases, backed by public documents and a partition finally worked out as if by a court decree, may it be accepted.

Are partitions made before the amendment reopened?

Not if they were valid. Any disposition, alienation, partition or testamentary disposition that took place before 20 December 2004 is protected, subject to the Court's strict approach to proving a partition.

Sources

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